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Abstract
Public projects can succeed or fail for many reasons
such as the feasibility of the original goal and coordination among contributors. One major reason for
failure is that insufficient work leaves the project
partially completed. For certain types of projects
anything short of full completion is a failure (e.g.,
feature request on software projects in GitHub).
Therefore, project success relies heavily on individuals allocating sufficient effort. When there are
multiple public projects, each contributor needs to
make decisions to best allocate his/her limited effort (e.g., time) to projects while considering the effort allocation decisions of other strategic contributors and his/her parameterized utilities based on
values and costs for the projects. In this paper, we
introduce a game-theoretic effort allocation model
of contributors to public projects for modeling effort allocation of strategic contributors. We study
the related Nash equilibrium (NE) computational
problems and provide NP-hardness results for the
existence of NE and polynomial-time algorithms
for finding NE in restricted settings. Finally, we
investigate the inefficiency of NE measured by the
price of anarchy and price of stability.

1

Introduction

Often, we jointly work together on public projects. This
ranges from small projects involving a few contributors
(e.g., a medium sized feature request on GitHub) to massive
projects involving several nations (e.g., International Space
Station). Each contributor can allocate his/her available effort (e.g., time) to the set of projects and determines the utility trade-off between reward (e.g., satisfaction) and cost (e.g.,
how fatiguing it is to allocate effort) per project. Joint projects
can succeed or fail for many reasons: shifting requirements,
management inexperience, etc., [McConnell, 1996]. One
common pivotal point that many projects have is that there
is a minimal threshold or amount of work that must be completed before the project succeeds. This can apply to public
projects, e.g., in software development [McConnell, 1996]
∗

Corresponding author

and “Get Big Fast” type businesses [Spolsky, 2004]. The
common thread is that a given project provides little to no
utility until it is completed in its entirety. Project failure is
not uncommon and contributors continue to exert effort in
projects which may not succeed [McConnell, 1996]. This behavior seems irrational on its face, but effort allocation behavior among contributors to such projects is complex. To judge
the rationality of a contributor’s decision to allocate effort to
a particular set of projects, these questions must be explored:
(Modeling) How would strategic contributors behave if a project’s success depended solely on total contribution meeting a threshold? How would
strategic contributors allocate effort to a given
available set of projects with such requirements?
(Computation) What are the corresponding (Nash)
equilibrium computation questions and results?
Our goal in this paper is to address the above questions,
theoretically and computationally, through game-theoretic
models and analysis focusing on strategic interactions of
strategic and rational contributors for public project contributions.
Our Contribution. To address the modeling and computational questions, we first introduce a game-theoretic Effort
Allocation model of Contributors to Public Projects (EACPP)
where a set D of contributors determines the number of discrete units of effort (e.g., hours) to allocate to a set P of available projects with contribution threshold requirements. Each
contributor i ∈ D gains utility for each project j ∈ P depending on i’s effort allocation for project j, aij ; i’s intrinsic
value of j, vij ; i’s skill related to j, sij ; the cost for i of each
unit of effort contributed to j, cij ; j’s contribution threshold, tj ; and most importantly, the effort allocation of other
strategic contributors. Given the EACPP model, our interest
is the Nash equilibrium (NE) computational questions, and
the measurement for the efficiency of NEs. We first show–via
novel reduction from partition problems–that the following
are NP-complete, even in the restricted settings where each
contributor has a single unit of effort to allocate to projects,
skill is project-independent (i.e., sij = si ), and effort is costless (i.e., cij = 0): (1) determining the existence of a NE, (2)
determining the existence of a NE with at least k successful
projects, (3) determining the existence of a NE with social
welfare of at least V , and (4) determining the existence of a
NE with a fixed effort allocation of contributors.

We then consider further restrictions on the model parameters. First, for the restricted settings where vij = vi or
vij = vj under certain threshold and skill configurations, we
show that a NE always exists and can be computed in polynomial time using an ordered sequential response algorithm (see
Theorems 3 and 4). Second, when there are constant number of projects, we can find all NEs in pseudo-polynomial
time in terms of thePnumber n of contributors and parameter
r := maxj∈P (1 + i∈D sij ) (see Theorem 5).
We consider a planner’s problem of obtaining optimal outcomes that maximize either (i) the social welfare (i.e., the
sum of the utilities of the contributors) or (ii) the number
of successful projects by allocating effort of contributors to
projects. We show that the corresponding optimization problems are NP-hard (see Theorem 6). We investigate the efficiency of NEs by examining the price of anarchy (PoA)
[Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Roughgarden, 2005],
which is defined as the ratio between the optimal solution and
the worst NE, and the price of stability (PoS) which is defined
as the ratio between the optimal solution and the best NE [Anshelevich et al., 2008] (See Section 5.) We show that they can
be unbounded for both objectives, and identify the restricted
settings where they are bounded or even equal to one.

1.1

Related Work

Below, we compare EACPP and our contributions to related
work and highlight the key differences in several areas.
Project Games. The most related problem to EAPCC is
project games [Bilò et al., 2019] where each player selects
a single project. Any project selected by at least one player
is realized and the reward for the project is divided among
contributing players. Similar to EACPP, players have skill
(called weight) and reward is split proportionally based on
contribution. The key difference from EACPP is that there is
no threshold. One can view their model as a special case of
ours under several restrictions on the model parameters, including zero threshold and cost for each project. Throughout
the paper, we will elaborate the implication of their results.
Contests. There is a line of research where a set of contestants competes in a set of contests [DiPalantino and Vojnovic,
2009; Bernergård and Wärneryd, 2017; Morgan et al., 2017;
Azmat and Möller, 2009; Azmat and Möller, 2017; Chan et
al., 2020; Xu et al., 2019]. In such settings, each contestant
selects (a subset of) contests and/or determines the amount
of effort to compete for prizes. In these settings, each contest is typically modeled using single contest semantics such
as a Tullock contest, all pay-auction, and their variants (e.g.,
see [Dechenaux et al., 2015; Konrad, 2009]). However, these
models do not consider threshold requirement for each contest, and the contest’s success is not measured in terms of
overall contributions of the contestants.
Congestion Games. In a congestion game (see e.g., [Rosenthal, 1973; Fotakis, 2015; Kontogiannis and Spirakis, 2005;
Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Mavronicolas et al., 2007;
Kleinberg and Oren, 2011]), there is a set of resources and a
set of players. Each player’s action set consists of some subsets of the resources. The player’s goal is to select an action
that minimizes the sum of the delay of each selected resource
in the selected action where the delay is defined to be some

increasing function of the number of players that selected the
resource. Our EACPP is different from congestion games and
their variations mainly in that there is a threshold for each
resource/project and positive utility can only be obtained if
there are sufficient contributions to the resource/project.
Networked Public Goods/Crowdfunding Games. Recent
related works (see e.g., [Yu et al., 2020; Komarovsky et al.,
2015; Kempe et al., 2020; Arieli et al., 2018]) consider networked public goods games where each individual makes a
binary decision to contribute to a public good project. An individual decision depends on (a function that maps) the number of other individuals in the individual’s social network and
the cost of contribution. Different from EACPP, public goods
games and their variants consider only a single project with
no threshold requirement or/and individual project model parameters related to values and effort contributions.

2

Game-theoretic Effort Allocation Models

In this section, we present a game-theoretic Effort Allocation
model of Contributors to Public Projects (EACPP). In an
EACPP game-theoretic model, we have a set D = {1, ..., n}
of n contributors and a set P = {1, ..., m} of m projects indexing using i and j, respectively.
Contributors. Each contributor i ∈ D allocates his/her (discrete) units of effort hi (e.g., work hours) among the set of
public projects. Thus,
Pm the set of i’s actions is Ai = {ai ∈
{0, 1, ..., hi }m |
j=1 aij = hi } where, given an allocation
vector ai ∈ Ai , aij specifiesQ
the units of effort allocated to
n
project j ∈ P . We let A = i=1 Ai be the joint-action set
of effort allocation vectors. Contributor i’s contribution depends on both the allocated effort and personal skills on the
projects. Skill can be viewed as the efficiency of converting
effort into contribution (e.g., an experienced software developer is more efficient than a novice). For each i ∈ D, let the
integer sij ≥ 0 be i’s skill for project j. Given allocation vector ai ∈ Ai , i’s contribution to j is aij sij , representing the
impact of i’s skill on the effort they allocated to j. For each
i ∈ D, there is a (per-unit effort) cost cij for each project
j ∈ P such that the total cost of j to i under ai is defined
by aij cij . Finally, there is an overall personal (satisfaction)
value vij ≥ 0 contributor i has for project j if j is successful.
Projects. Each project j ∈ P has a contribution threshold tj ≥ 0 where the project is successful when the total
contribution to j by all contributors exceeds the threshold.
Given joint-action
Pn a ∈ A, the total contribution on project j
is T Cj (a) = i=1 aij sij . A project j succeeds if and only
if T Cj (a) > 0 and T Cj (a) ≥ tj .
Utilities. Given an action profile a ∈ A, a reward for contributor i ∈ D for project j ∈ P is defined to be


−cij aij
rij (a) = −cij aij

vij aij sij − cij aij
T Cj (a)

T Cj (a) = 0
T Cj (a) < tj
otherwise.

As motivated from existing literature (e.g., project games
[Bilò et al., 2019] and Tullock contests [Dechenaux et al.,
2015; Konrad, 2009]), we consider a simple proportional rule
to divide utility among contributors according to contribution

made. This allows us to model many complex motivations,
such as the prestige of being listed as a top contributor to a
popular project or differential allocation of reward based on
the proportion of work done. If i contributes additional work
beyond tj then i receives a larger proportion of the project,
but the value of the project is not increased.
PmThe utility of contributor i ∈ D is defined to be ui (a) = j=1 rij (a) which is
the sum of the rewards over the projects.
Objectives. We quantify the quality of an action profile a ∈
A by considering two objectives, namely, the social welfare
(SW) objective
P and the projects successful (PS) objective: (1)
SW (a) = i∈D P
ui (a) is the total utility of all contributors,
and (2) P S(a) = j∈P 1[T Cj (a) ≥ tj ∧T Cj (a) > 0] is the
number of successful projects, where 1[·] is an indicator function. The planner wants to find optimal solutions that maximizes the objectives. We let aoptsw ∈ argmaxa∈A SW (a)
and aoptps ∈ argmaxa∈A P S(a) be the optimal solutions that
maximize the SW and PS objectives, respectively.
Given an EACPP instance I = (D, P, {cij }, {sij },
{vij }, {hi }, {tj }) (indices omitted), our goal is to compute
a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium (NE).
Definition 1. A joint-effort allocation vector a ∈ A is
a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium (NE) if and only if
ui (ai , a−i ) ≥ ui (āi , a−i ) for any āi ∈ Ai and each i ∈ D.
Unfortunately, a NE might not always exist in an arbitrary
EACPP. Below we provide an example.
Example 1. Consider an instance I = (D, P, {cij }, {sij },
{vij }, {hi }, {tj }) where D = {1, 2}, P = {1, 2}, cij = 0,
vij = v, hi = 1 for all i ∈ D, j ∈ P , s1j = s1 , s2j = s2 ,
and tj = s1 for all j ∈ D for s1 > s2 . In such a setting,
contributor 1 alone is enough to make the projects successful
whereas contributor 2 cannot. Contributor 2 always prefers
to select the same project as contributor 1, and contributor 1
would always prefer to work on any one of the projects independently. It is easy to see that there is no NE.
We note that our model can be further generalized and extended to cases where (a) the total contribution T Cj can be an
arbitrarily non-decreasing function and (b) the proportional
contribution term in the reward function rij can be any contest success function. However, as we will see in the next
section, the computational questions related to NE are already
NP-complete for various instances of our model.
We also remark that EACPP captures simultaneous strategic interactions of the contributors when they make effort allocation decisions at the same time in the complete information setting. It would be interesting to extend the models further to (a) consider sequential interactions where contributors
determine effort allocation over time and/or (b) incomplete
information where the model parameters (e.g., values, skills,
and costs) are drawn from some distributions.
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Complexity of Computing a NE in EACPP

In this section, we consider the complexity questions related
to the existence of a NE in EACPP. In particular, we show
that the following questions are all NP-complete in EACPP:
1. Is there a NE?

2. Is there a NE where at least k projects are successful?
3. Is there a NE that obtains a social welfare of at least V ?
4. Is there a NE that is consistent with a fixed assignment?
All the computational questions are NP-complete even in the
case where cij = 0, sij = si , and hi = 1 for all i ∈ D
and j ∈ P (i.e., each contributor has a cost of zero for each
project with skill independent of the projects and can only
select a single project). Our reductions use the known NPcomplete Partition Problem (PP) [Garey and Johnson, 1979]:
Partition Problem (PP) Given a set X = {x1 , ..., xn } of n
distinct positive integers,
is there
P
P a partition of X to X1
and X2 such that x∈X1 x = x∈X2 x?
Theorem 1. It is NP-complete to determine whether there is
a NE in EACPP.
Proof. This problem is in NP, because we can verify whether
a given profile a ∈ A is a NE in polynomial time by checking
for m − 1 deviations for each of the n contributors.
To prove our claim, we reduce from PP. Consider an instance of PP with X = {x1 , ..., xn } of n positive (unique)
integers such that x1 > x2 > ... > xn (with the total
sum divisible by 2), we reduce it to an instance of EACPP
I = (D, P, {cij }, {sij }, {vij }, {hi }, {tj }) via the following:
• Let m = n + 2 be the number of projects;
• Let n be the number of contributors;
• Let hi = 1 for each i ∈ D;
• Let sij = xi and cij = 0 for each i ∈ D and j ∈ P ;
• For each j ∈ P \ {1, 2}, let xP
n−1 > tj > xn be some
x
threshold and t1 = t2 = T = x∈X
;
2
• For each i ∈ D \ {n} and j ∈ P \ {1, 2}, vij = vi > 0
s
sij
and vi1 = vi2 such that vi1 Tij > vi > vi1 T +0.5
;
• For n and j ∈ P \ {1, 2}, vnj = vn > 0 and vn1 = vn2
snj
such that vn1 2T
> vn .
The next to last parameter settings ensure that contributor i ∈
D \ {n} always prefers either project 1 or project 2 when
the projects are successful with exactly T total contribution
and, otherwise, one of the other projects (3, ..., m) without
any other contributors. The last setting ensures that n prefers
either project 1 or 2 as long the projects are successful.
PP solution =⇒ NE. It is not hard to see that if there is
partition of X into X1 and X2 with the same sum T , then
we have a NE. In particular, for i with skill xi ∈ Xl for all j
for some l = 1, 2, then ail = 1 and aik = 0 for each other
project k. It is easy to check that for i ∈ D, i has no incentive
to deviate (see the last two items listed).
NE =⇒ PP solution. Suppose there is a NE. We argue that, in any NE, n must either select successful project
1 or project 2. If this is not the case, then n must select
one of the {3, ..., m} projects. If there are other contributors in {3, ..., m}, it must be the case they are all in different
projects and n will select one of them as a best response, say
the project with i because each project j requires threshold
tj > xn , which cannot be competed by n alone. However, i
will deviate to another project without any contributor (which
always exists since there are n other projects).

If there are no other contributors in {3, ..., m}, it must be
the case that all of them are in either project 1 or project 2,
but this cannot be a NE, since the threshold of each project is
T and n is not in project 1 or 2. As a result, the projects must
have threshold greater or less than T . In either case, this cannot be a NE as the contributors will deviate (by construction).
In order to sustain a NE where n is in project 1 or project
2, at least one of the projects has to be successful with exactly T total contribution (including xn ). The remaining contributors are either together in project 1 or 2 or in different
projects of {3, ..., m}. It follows that one can construct a solution of PP by letting X1 be the set of positive integers with
xi corresponding to ail = 1 for l(= 1 or 2) project(s) with
exactly T contribution with xn . The remaining positive integers/contributors will be in X2 which has the same sum as
X1 by construction.
Theorem 2. It is NP-complete to determine whether there is
a NE with at least k successful projects in EACPP, determine
whether there is a NE with social welfare at least V , or determining the existence of a NE with a fixed effort allocation
of contributors.1

1
2
3
4
5
6

7

Algorithm 1: Ordered Sequential Response
Input: I = (D, P, {cij }, {sij }, {vij }, {hi }, {tj })
Output: A NE profile a ∈ A
Let a = 0
# Set a to be a set of zero vectors.
Order contributors via parameter: D = {1, ..., n}
for i = 1, ..., n do
Let BRi (a−i ) = argmaxa0i ∈Ai ui (a0i , a−i )
Select āi ∈ BRi (a−i ), set ai = āi
#Note: if vij = 0; ∀j ∈ P , select āi with a
project with the lowest total contribution
end

(a) vij = vj and tj ≤ sn for all i, j or
(b) vij = vi and tj ≤ sn for all i, j
with contributor’s ordering induced by skills s1 ≥ ... ≥ sn .

Algorithms for Computing NE in EACPP

Proof. We first consider the setting of (a) where vij = vj ,
s1 ≥ s2 ... ≥ sn , and tj ≤ sn for all i, j. Let i be
the ith contributor in the algorithm. For simplicity, we let
a(0) = 0, ..., a(n) be the action profile of Algorithm 1 after
each iteration. We now show that, via induction, after (line 5)
setting ai = āi such that aij = 1 and aik = 0, ∀k 6= j, āi ∈
BRi (a−i ), no other contributor i0 = 1, ..., i − 1 would deviate. The basic case is straightforward when i = 1. Now we
assume it is true up until i − 1. There are two possible cases
we need to consider. If ai0 j 6= aij , we have that
s i0
s i0
≥ vw
ui0 (a(i−1) ) = vk
T Ck (a(i−1) )
T Cw (a(i−1) ) + si0

In Section 3, we have shown that determining the existence of a NE is NP-complete in instances I =
(D, P, {cij }, {sij }, {vij }, {hi }, {tj }) where each i ∈ D can
only select one project (i.e., hi = 1), has zero-cost for all
projects (i.e., cij = 0 for all j), and has skill independent
of the projects (i.e., sij = si for all j). In this section, we
investigate EACPP where we can compute NE efficiently.

where ai0 k = 1, k 6= j, and w 6= k. The inequality continues
to hold for a(i) as the only difference is on the j project (with
the addition of i) and T Cj (a(i) ) is nondecreasing.
If ai0 j = aij = 1, it follows that ui (a(i) ) =
si
si
si
≥ vw
≥ vw
vj
(i)
(i)
T Cj (a )
T Cw (a ) + si
T Cw (a(i) ) + si0

4.1

for any w 6= j and i0 . Thus, for any i0 , we can show that i0
has no incentive to deviate from j by dividing si > 0 and
multiplying si0 > 0 from the above inequality. We can use a
similar argument as above for part (b).

We remark that positive results can be achieved in some
more restricted settings. When hi = 1, cij = 0, sij = si ,
vij = vj , tj = 0, a NE can be computed in polynomial time
[Bilò et al., 2019; Fotakis et al., 2002]. In addition, when
hi = 1, cij = 0, vij = v, tj = 0, the better response dynamics always converges to a NE [Bilò et al., 2019].

4

A Polynomial-Time Algorithm

The hardness results suggest that in order to derive an efficient
algorithm for computing a NE, one must place further restrictions on the value vij and tj in addition to the parameter settings in the hardness proofs. Our following result shows that
if each project can be successfully completed by any player
working alone using a single effort allocation and vij are restricted (i.e., vij = vi or vij = vj ), then a NE always exists
and can be computed via ordered sequential response (Algorithm 1). Algorithm 1 starts by ordering the contributors
subject to some parameter, and lets each contributor, under
the same ordering, sequentially select a best response. After
all contributors have selected actions, it returns a NE.
Theorem 3. Let I = (D, P, {cij }, {sij }, {vij }, {hi }, {tj })
be an EACPP instance where (1) hi = 1, (2) cij = 0, and
(3) sij = si such that s1 ≥ ... ≥ sn for all i, j. Algorithm 1
returns a NE for the following settings in polynomial time:

In the above setting, we consider cases where tj ≤ sn for
each project j. The threshold effectively does not exist because every player can overcome it. A natural question is
whether we can identify instances where tj > sn for which
we can compute NE efficiently. We can answer this question
affirmatively if the contributors have the same skill level (i.e.,
sij = s) and the vij are restricted (i.e., vij = vi or vij = vj ).
Theorem 4. Let I = (D, P, {cij }, {sij }, {vij }, {hi }, {tj })
be an EACPP instance where (1) hi = 1, (2) cij = 0, and (3)
sij = s for all i, j. One can compute a NE for the following
settings in polynomial time:
(a) vij = vj for all i, j or
(b) vij = vi for all i, j.

1
Omitted proofs can be found in the supplementary material at:
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork/332/

Proof (Sketch). Assume w.l.o.g. t1 ≤ ... ≤ tm . If every
project requires at least two contributors (i.e, tj > s for each

j), then setting the action of each contributor to a project (say
j) is a NE as no contributor can unilaterally deviate to obtain
a better utility. As such, we assume that there is a project,
say k from the threshold ordering, that can be achieved by a
single contributor (this can be verified in polynomial time). It
follows that each project 1, ..., k can be achieved by a single
contributor. Applying Algorithm 1 to current settings for setting (a) or (b), we obtain a NE by ordering the contributors
arbitrarily, which can be proved using Theorem 3.

4.2

A Pseudo-Polynomial Algorithm

In general, we can use a standard enumeration approach to
determine the existence of a NE, which would result in a
running time of O(nmn+1 ) that is exponential in the number of contributors. It turns out that we can derive an improved enumeration algorithm with a polynomial runningtime in the number of contributors
and a natural model paP
rameter r := maxj∈P (1 + i∈D sij ), when the number of
projects is bounded (and recall that sij is an integer). The
assumption that m is bounded is natural, because in reality
the planner often faces a small number of projects but a large
number of contributors. We now give the pseudo-polynomial
time algorithm when hi = 1 and m is a constant.
Theorem 5. When hi = 1 and the number of projects m is
a constant, there exists a pseudo-polynomial algorithm that
returns all NE in O(rm (nmrm + nm2 )).
Proof. We say vector q = (q1 , ..., qm ) is a potential-sum configuration, if qj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} for any j ∈ P . Let Q be
the set of all of such configurations. Clearly, |Q| = rm . The
entry of a configuration corresponds to the total contribution
on a project (i.e., qj = c means that project j receives a total
contribution of c.). Note that for every a ∈ A there exists a
q ∈ Q such that T Cj (a) = qj . Therefore by checking every
q ∈ Q for the existence of a NE, every possible strategy profile is checked.2 We note that, to check if a solution is a NE, it
suffices to rely on the information of the corresponding configuration. Our algorithm consists of the following two steps:
for every configuration q = (q1 , ..., qm ) ∈ Q,
Step 1: Compute the set of best-response strategies/projects bi ⊆ P for the given q and each contributor
i ∈ D. More specifically, we define and compute

−cij
x = 0 or x < tj
∗
rij
(x) =
s
vij xij − cij otherwise.
∗
∗
bi = {j ∈ P | rij
(qj ) ≥ rik
(qk + sik ), ∀k ∈ P \ {j}}.

Let b = (b1 , . . . , bn ) be the profile of best-response projects.
Step 2: Given the profile b, we check if b can induce the
potential-sum configuration q, that is, there exist an action
profile a, such that for any i ∈ D, j ∈ P , (1) aij = 1 if and
only if j ∈ bi , and (2) T Cj (a) = qj .
The correctness is clear: if the answer in Step 2 is “yes”,
then configuration q gives a NE; if the answer is “no” for
all q ∈ Q, then there is no NE. Next, we analyze the time
complexity. For each of the rm = |Q| configurations, the
2

The mapping of a to q is neither one-to-one nor onto.

time for Step 1 is at most O(nm2 ) as we need to compare
each project with m − 1 other projects for each contributor.
Step 2 can be done efficiently using dynamic programming
where (1) one can first order the contributor 1, ..., n and (2)
create a binary table Ti (q) ∈ {0, 1} for each q ∈ Q of size
rm for each contributor i. Defining T0 (0) = 1 (with entry of
zero otherwise), Ti (q) = 1 if only if there exists Ti−1 (q̄) = 1
such that q = q̄ + ek ∗ sik for some project k ∈ bi where ek
is a binary vector of size m of all zero except the k th entry.
Table Ti can simply be constructed by looking at all the 1’s q̄
entries of Ti−1 and add sik to each entry for each k ∈ bi . Because there are at most rm configurations, and each of the n
contributors have at most m choices/projects for contributing to the configurations, the time for this step is at most
O(nmrm ). To verify whether a given q can be achieved,
one can check if Tn (q) = 1 and the corresponding NE can be
constructed via a standard backtracking procedure in dynamic
programming.3 The total time to check a given potential-sum
q is O(nmrm + nm2 ). Yielding O(rm (nmrm + nm2 )) to
check all q ∈ Q, which is polynomial in n and r, when m is
a constant for each configuration.

5

Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria in EACPP

In this section, we consider the inefficiency, measured with
respect to the planner’s objective, induced by the strategic
behavior of contributors. To measure such an inefficiency,
we invoke the notion of the price of anarchy (PoA) [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999] which is the ratio between
the optimal “centralized” efficiency and the worst-case NE’s
efficiency. Also, we consider the price of stability (PoS) [Anshelevich et al., 2008], which is the ratio between the optimal
efficiency and the best NE’s efficiency.
The following result shows that computing optimal solutions is NP-hard for either maximizing the social welfare, or
maximizing the successful projects.
Theorem 6. It is NP-hard to find an optimal solution that
maximizes social welfare, or to find an optimal solution that
maximizes the number of successful projects, even if hi =
1, cij = 0, vij = v.
Proof (Sketch). For the social welfare objective, we can reduce from the PP problem where we are given a set of n integers and a target T . The constructed EACPP instance consists of two projects with threshold T , where each of the n
contributors can only select one project with value of T , and
has skill si (corresponding to the integer) and zero cost for
each project. One can obtain a social welfare no less than 2T
if and only if there is a solution to the PP problem.
For the project successful objective, we can reduce from
the 3-Partition Problem (3PP), which given a set of 3n positive integers, seeks a partition into n subsets of size 3 such
that their sums are equal. It is easy to show that there is a solution to the 3-PP instance if and only if there is a solution of a
constructed EACPP instance where all projects succeed.
3
If multiple NE correspond to the same q, then there is one path
from Tn (q) to T0 (0) for each NE.

In contrast, we remark that, for a more constrained setting
where hi = 1, cij = 0, vij = vj , tj = 0, maximizing social
welfare can be done in polynomial time [Bilò et al., 2019].
Next, we consider PoA and PoS which is defined to be
(aoptsw )
(aoptsw )
P oAsw = max SWSW
, P oS sw = min SWSW
, and
(a)
(a)
a∈NE

a∈NE

similarly for P oAps and P oS ps , where NE ⊆ A is the set of
all NEs. Clearly, P oS ≤ P oA. Notice that we focus only
on the instances in which NE exists.4 The following results
show that the PoS can be unbounded for either objective.
Theorem 7. P oS ps is unbounded, even if hi = 1 and sij =
s. P oS sw is also unbounded, even if hi = 1, sij = s, cij = 0.
Proof. We first consider P oS ps . Consider the instance
I = (D, P, {sij }, {cij }, {vij }, {tj }) where |D| = 2, |P | =
2, sij = 1, vi1 = 0, ci1 = 0, ci2 = 1 for i ∈ D, j ∈ P . The
values for project 2 are v12 = 0, v22 = 3. The thresholds are
t1 = 3, t2 = 2. Note that project 1 can never be completed
and project 2 can only be completed when a12 = a22 = 1.
Agent 1 will never choose project 2 because it has a cost
c12 = 1 and a value v12 = 0, while the cost of project 1 is
c11 = 0. Agent 2 will choose project 2 only if the threshold
is reached. Therefore, the only NE is a11 = a21 = 1 where
0 projects are completed. However, the optimal solution is
a12 = a22 = 1 where 1 project is completed.
Next, we consider P oS sw . Consider an instance I =
(D, P, {sij }, {vij }, {tj }) where |D| = |P | = 2, t1 = 0, t2 =
2, hi = 1, sij = 1 and cij = 0 for any i ∈ D, j ∈ P .
For contributor 1, v11 = 1, v12 = 0, and for contributor 2,
v21 = 1, v22 = L, where L is a sufficiently large number. We
show that, there is a NE with a11 = a21 = 1, which has a
social welfare 2. Clearly contributor 1 has no incentive to deviate because it has positive value only for project 1. For contributor 2, the utility is 1, and if it deviates to project 2, then
the utility decreases to 0. Moreover, noting that the only way
for both contributors having positive utility is a11 = a21 = 1,
this is the unique NE. However, the optimal solution is that
both contributors select project 2 (i.e., a12 = a22 = 1), and
the optimal social welfare is L. The ratio between the optimal
social welfare and the social welfare in the NE is L2 , which
tends to ∞ when L → ∞. Thus, P oS sw is unbounded.
Despite the negative results above, we are able to identify instances in which the PoA is bounded for both objectives. For the social welfare objective, [Bilò et al., 2019]
proved that, when hi = 1, tj = 0, cij = 0, vij = v,
it always has P oS sw = P oAsw = 1; and if the condition vij = v is relaxed to vij = vj , then it always has
P oAsw (n, m) ≤ 1 + min{n,m}−1
. Further, for the successful
n
project objective, we have the following results.
Theorem 8. When hi = 1 and cij = 0 for all i ∈ D, j ∈ P ,
we have P oS ps = n.
4
We note that P oAsw or P oS sw typically assume both of the
quantities in the fraction to be non-negative. If both quantities are
negative, then we can flip the fraction. If the numerator and denominator are positive and negative, respectively, then we say that the
PoA is unbounded. When the denominator is zero, we say that the
value is one if the numerator is zero, otherwise it is unbounded.

Proof. We first prove P oS ps ≤ n. The optimal solution has
at most min{m, n} successful projects. Note that we focus on
instances in which NE exists. It suffices to prove the existence
of a NE with at least one successful project.
If there is a project j ∈ P and contributor i satisfying
sij ≥ tj and vij > 0, then every NE must have at least one
successful project, otherwise contributor i can deviate to j
and obtain a positive utility. So we only need to consider the
case where that does not hold. We construct a NE a with at
least one successful project as follows. Let j ∗ ∈ P be an
arbitrary project that has potential to be successful. For any
i ∈ D, set aij ∗ = 1, and set aij = 0 for all j 6= j ∗ . Clearly,
project j ∗ is successful. No contributor has incentive to deviate, because no project can be satisfied by a single contributor
who has positive value to this project. Hence, action profile a
is a NE with at least one successful project.
Now we prove P oS ps ≥ n. Consider an instance I =
(D, P, {sij }, {vij }, {tj }) where |D| = |P | = n, tj =
0, sij = 1 for i ∈ D, j ∈ P . For i ∈ D, set vij ∗ = 1 and
vij = 0 for all project j 6= j ∗ . Clearly, the optimal solution
that maximizes the number of successful projects is that every
project is contributed by a unique contributor, and the number of successful projects is n. However, the unique NE is
that all contributors contribute to project j ∗ , where every one
has a positive utility, and the number of successful projects is
1. Hence, the PoS is at least n.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we consider a game-theoretic model of how
contributors allocate effort (e.g., time) to contribute to a set
of public projects where each project is successful if the total
contribution meets or exceeds a predetermined project threshold. We study several computational and efficiency questions
associated with pure-strategy Nash equilibria (NE). In particular, we show that the computational problems (i.e., existence
of NE with/without required properties) are generally hard,
and NE can be very inefficient (i.e., P oS). We note that the
major obstacle for obtaining positive results is the existence
of minimum threshold, which ensures that no project receiving a total contribution below the threshold can be completed.
Compared with Project Games studied in [Bilò et al., 2019],
the threshold version studied in our paper becomes a bit intractable in the sense of both NP-hardness and PoA. However,
we show that when we further restrict the model parameters,
various computational and efficiency NE questions become
tractable and positive, respectively.
Regarding the future directions, many variants of EACPP
could be investigated. Non-binary project outcomes could be
modeled, and most notably, additional contributions beyond
the minimum threshold could increase the quality or probability of success for a project. Other variants, such as public reward in addition to contributors’ reward, and individuals’ different skills (e.g., programming, project management, marketing) for projects, are also possible. Such variations could
be useful in a variety of applications, such as software engineering research [Stevens et al., 2021]. Finally, with some
modifications this model would be interesting to study as a
cooperative game [Bachrach and Rosenschein, 2008].
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Supplementary Material
Proof of Theorem 2
We prove the three claims one by one in the following.
Claim 1. It is NP-complete to determine whether there is a
NE with at least k successful projects.
Proof. It is not hard to see that we can verify whether a given
NE has at least k successful projects (both of which can be
verified in polynomial time).
We reduce from the 3-PP problem. In a (feasible) 3-PP,
we have a multiset X = {x1 , ..., x3n }P
of 3n positive integers
x
with positive integer target sum T = x∈X
and T4 < xi <
n
T
2.
We consider our EAPPC instance I
=
(D, P, {cij }, {sij }, {vij }, {hi }, {tj }) via the following:
• Let m = n be the number of projects;
• Let 3n be the number of contributors;
• Let hi = 1 for each i ∈ D;
• Let sij = xi and cij = 0 for each i ∈ D and j ∈ P ;
• For each j ∈ P , let tj = T ;
• For each i ∈ D and j ∈ P , let vij = v for some v.
• Let k = m for the successful projects.
3-PP solution =⇒ NE at least k projects. Given a solution,
X1 , ..., Xn , each has a sum of T , for the 3-PP instance, we
can construct a NE with at least k successful projects. In
particular, for each xi ∈ Xl , ail = 1 for l = 1, ..., n (and
ail0 = 0 otherwise for l0 6= l). Since the total contribution
is T for each project, each i with ail = 1 would have no
xi
for any l0 ).
incentive to deviate (i.e., vil xTi ≥ vil0 T +x
i
NE at least k projects =⇒ 3-PP solution. Suppose there
is a NE with at least k successful projects. This implies that
all projects are successful, and each project has the total contribution of exactly T (i.e., if there is a project with total contribution > T , there will be a project with total contribution
< T where contributors in the project will have an incentive
to deviate). For each project, there must be ≥ 3 contributors
(since T4 < xi < T2 ). Since there are 3n contributors and n
projects, each project must have exactly 3 contributors in the
NE. Thus, we can construct a solution to 3-PP by letting Xj
be xi that corresponds to contributor i in project j.
Claim 2. It is NP-complete to determine whether there is a
NE with social welfare of at least V .
Proof. The proof uses a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 1 – we take an instance of PP and reduce it to an instance
of EAPPC. The reduction is identical except when we set vij
for each i ∈ D and j ∈ P (last two items of the list in the
proof of Theorem 1) where we set the appropriate values via
the following construction:
• For each i ∈ D \ {n} and j ∈ P \ {1, 2}, vij = vi > 0
s
and vi1 = vi2 should be such that (1) vi1 Tij = sij ( =⇒
sij
sij
vi1 = vi2 = T ) and (2) vi1 T > vi > vi1 T +0.5
;
• For n and j ∈ P \ {1, 2}, vnj = vn > 0 and vn1 = vn2
snj
snj
such that (1) vn1 2T
= snj and (2) vn1 2T
> vn ;

• Finally, we set V = T .
It is not hard to see that the arguments (in the proof of Theorem 1) would follow since there is a NE with a social welfare
of at least V for our instance if and only if there is a solution
for the PP instance.
Our next computational question is related to a fixed assignment of some contributors to some projects. More specifically, given a partially fixed allocation profile aS ∈ AS for
some contributors S ⊆ D, we would like to determine if there
is a NE a∗ that is consistent with the fixed allocation profile
where a∗S = aS .
Claim 3. It is NP-complete to determine whether there is a
NE that is consistent with some fixed assignment aS ∈ AS for
some contributors S ⊆ D in EAPPC.
Proof. The proof in this theorem uses the same reduction
and construction as the proof of Theorem 1. After the construction, we fix the assignment of n to be in project 1 (i.e.,
an1 = 1 and anj = 0 for other j).
To argue that a solution, say X1 and X2 , of PP can be
mapped to a NE where n is in project 1, notice that xn must
be in one of the two partitions, say in X2 . For the corresponding contributors in X2 , they will take the action of selecting
project 1. Following the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 1, this is a clearly a NE and n is fixed to project
1. Next, to argue that a NE with n fixed in project 1 can be
mapped to a solution of PP, notice that in any NE, n has to be
in project 1 or project 2. If there is a NE where n is in project
2, we can swap the contributors of the two (homogeneous)
projects and obtain another (isomorphic) NE. Following the
proof of Theorem 1, we can construct a solution for PP using
the NE.

